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The False Claims Act ("FCA") deputizes private citizens to
combat fraud against the United States government by offering them
a portion of the bounty.' This concept has existed in some form for
hundreds of years-the strategy of "setting a rogue to catch a rogue."2
Medieval England used it in place of police forces.3 The American
Colonies caught pirates this way.4 Even Abraham Lincoln protected
the Union Army from faulty equipment by encouraging corrupt
military suppliers to report one another.5 In modern American history,
the FCA has proven extraordinarily effective at using this ancient
tactic. The Act fines wrongdoers triple the amount of damages
suffered by the government, plus $5,000 to $10,000 for every false
statement the violator made.6 Between 1987 and 2013, the federal
government recovered more than $27 billion as a result of modern-day
privateers coming forward under the FCA to claim their bounties on
fraud.7
The FCA "enhance[s] the Government's ability to recover losses
sustained as a result of fraud against the Government"8 and covers a
wide range of fraudulent activities including "present[ing] . . . a false
or fraudulent claim for payment," "us[ing] a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim," and "avoid[ing] or decreas[ing]
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government."9 The FCA further includes a qui tam provision that
1. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.").
2. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard).
3. Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 86 (1972) ("In
the early stages of English criminal law, enforcement of penal statutes was limited by the lack of
an effective public police force. To rectify this inadequacy, the courts permitted private accusers
to bring bills to enforce penal laws." (footnote omitted)).
4. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 776 (2000)
(citing Act for the Restraining and Punishing of Privateers and Pirates, 1st Assemb., 4th Sess.
(N.Y. 1692), reprinted in 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 279, 281 (1894) (permitting informers,
after filing suit, to receive part of the fines imposed on officers who failed to pursue privateers
and pirates)).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
7. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW, 1-2 (2013), http://
www.justice.gov/civil/does-forms/C-FRAUDSFCA-Statistics.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
2BBS-F7HS.
8. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G).
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allows private citizens to bring claims on behalf of the government.10
Individuals who bring such claims are called "relators."I This
provision entices relators to file FCA claims by offering up to thirty
percent of the government's recovery if the suit is successful.12
Under the FCA, once a relator files suit he cannot release the
claim without government approval.13 However, the Act does not
similarly restrict prefiling releases of qui tam claims-i.e., releases of
legal claims against the individual defrauding the government that
the relator signs before filing a lawsuit.14 In recent years, numerous
companies have taken advantage of the omission of prefiling
restrictions by requiring terminated employees to sign releases that
waive qui tam rights in exchange for generous severance packages.
Because companies can offer potential relators the complete certainty
of severance packages but a relator must weather the costs and risks
of litigation to win only thirty percent of FCA damages, potential
relators rationally choose the certainty of a severance package over
the mere potential of partial damages.15 Therefore, using severance
packages to cover up fraud may cost companies significantly less than
allowing terminated employees to bring qui tam claims. Additionally,
companies pay this "presettlement" to terminated employees, not the
defrauded government, shifting funds away from the rightful owner of
the claims to terminated employees.
In deciding whether to enforce these qui tam provisions, courts
primarily take the government-knowledge approach. If the
government has already investigated the fraud, the contract is
enforced and the former employee cannot bring the claim.
Alternatively, if the government had not investigated the claim at the
time of the employee's release, courts may refuse to enforce these
provisions.16 Unfortunately, the simple elegance of this solution is
10. Id. § 3730; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 2 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDSFCAPrimer.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
G45J-BR48.
ii. Id.
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 3.
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
14. See id.
15. Id. § 3730(d); see United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 965-66
(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the economic incentives for relators to take smaller but certain
settlements instead of filing qui tam claims under the FCA).
16. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 333 (4th
Cir. 2010) (holding that the disclosure of fraud allegations to the government prior to the filing of
a qui tam suit required that a release barring such claims brought in the suit be enforced);
United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a release of qui tam claims was enforceable under the government-knowledge
approach); United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 231 (9th Cir.
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misleading: it misaligns insider incentives, presents information-
obtainment difficulties, and denies the government the ability to
supplement its own prosecutorial efforts-one of the FCA's major
stated goals.17
Part II of this Note recounts the history of the False Claims Act
and the Act's evolution into its current version.18 It also highlights the
failure of the 1946 jurisdictional bar that prevented relators from
bringing suits on information that the government already knew-a
precursor to the flaws seen today in the courts' similar approach to
reviewing prefiling releases. Part III explains the current government-
knowledge approach and the enforceability of prefiling releases. It also
highlights the approach's many deficiencies, some of which parallel
the deficiencies in the rejected government-intervention approach that
one district court proposed.19 Part IV proposes that Congress should
adopt an agency-approval approach. Under this approach, federal
courts would enforce prefiling FCA qui tam releases only upon viewing
evidence that a federal agency completed an investigation into the
specific instance of fraud alleged in the FCA suit. The agency that
completed the investigation must have unearthed no fraudulent
behavior and certified that the company could contract for enforceable
prefiling releases of qui tam FCA claims.2 0 This approach aligns
whistle-blower incentives because insiders would not be able to
presettle a qui tam claim for less than the potential government
recovery amount without prior government approval. This approach
also maximizes fraud detection, deterrence, and recovery for several
reasons: First, insiders could only financially benefit from knowledge
of fraud by bringing qui tam suits and, second, from each successful
claim, the government could recover at least 210 percent damages
(treble damages less the maximum potential relator recovery).21
Furthermore, the increase in government detection and recovery
capabilities strengthens incentives for companies to avoid committing
fraud in the first place. Finally, this approach is consistent with the
1997) (holding a release to be enforceable because the "government had full knowledge of the
plaintiffs charges"); Northrop, 59 F.3d at 953 (holding that a release of qui tam claims was
unenforceable because "the government only learned of the allegations of fraud and conducted its
investigation because of the filing of the qui tam complaint").
17. See Northrop, 59 F.3d at 963 ("It is commonly recognized that the central purpose of
the qui tam provisions of the FCA is to 'set up incentives to supplement government enforcement'
of the Act . . . ." (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d
645, 649 (1994))).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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postfiling settlement requirement under the FCA that prevents a
relator from settling without government approval.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FROM THE THIRTEENTH
CENTURY TO THE LINCOLN LAW TO TODAY
A. The Origins and Development of Qui Tam in England and America:
Who as Well for the King as for Himself
Throughout the history of qui tam statutes like the FCA, the
government has struggled to find the right balance between
incentivizing fraud reporting and deterring vexatious and collusive
lawsuits. "Qui tam" is the accepted abbreviation for the Latin phrase
"qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,"
which means "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this
matter."22 This special type of proceeding is rooted in a common-law
method of joining royal and private causes of action in thirteenth-
century England.23 Royal interests received special treatment during
this time, and a separate royal court system heard suits addressing
the King's interests.24 Plaintiffs would allege a private wrong that
affected royal interests in order to gain access to the royal courts. This
was advantageous because royal courts were perceived as more
adequate and fair than many local courts.25 For example, in addition
to the private wrong, plaintiffs pleaded royal interests like "the king's
interest in lands held under royal tenure, . . . an interest in the safety
and well-being of his men, . . . and the dignity of the crown"26 to
transform a case from a private cause of action into a royal one. Later,
royal courts expanded their jurisdiction, and this type of qui tam
strategy was no longer necessary; however, despite this change, many
statutes began to allow private parties to sue to redress public
wrongs.27
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (10th ed. 2014); Note, supra note 3, at 83.
23. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774
(2000) ("Suit in this dual capacity was a device for getting their private claims into the respected
royal courts, which generally entertained only matters involving the Crown's interests."); Note,
supra note 3, at 85 ("Only by alleging a royal interest could a private party gain access to the
royal courts, since in the thirteenth century these courts generally considered only matters
involving the king.").
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 83-85.
25. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 774; Note, supra note 3, at 85.
26. Note, supra note 3, at 83 n.13 (citations omitted).
27. See id. at 85-86.
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Qui tam suits in early America were virtually identical in
procedure and structure to their English counterparts.28 Although
there is little evidence that colonists actually brought common-law qui
tam actions, there were many informer statutes expressly providing
for qui tam suits.2 9 For example, the First Congress passed statutes
allowing private citizens to sue and recover half the fine for a failure
to file census returns, half the penalty and forfeiture for a violation of
spirits duties, or half the forfeiture for unlicensed trading with Native
American tribes.30
On both sides of the Atlantic, qui tam provisions attracted
abuse of two kinds: collusive informers and vexatious suits brought by
informers.31 Collusive informers brought qui tam suits against their
friends and associates and either obtained confessed judgments for
only a portion of the wrongdoing or permitted the wrongdoer to prevail
at a staged trial.32 With a judgment already rendered, other informers
or the government were precluded from bringing future actions to
recover full damages.33 Similarly, plaintiffs who knew little or nothing
about the alleged wrongdoing but sought a share of any recovery
nonetheless brought vexatious lawsuits.34 These plaintiffs abused qui
tam provisions and sapped defendant and judicial resources by filing
opportunistic claims based on nonexistent, obsolete, or public
information.35
In England, Parliament initially attempted to combat such
abuses by abolishing informer provisions altogether, but it found this
impeded enforcement of penal laws because informers helped expose
criminal abuses.36 More effectively, Parliament eliminated the
preclusive effects of qui tam suits, preventing wrongdoers from
escaping liability with the use of collusive informers.37 Parliament also
imposed penalties on those who brought vexatious suits, imposed a
28. See id. at 97.
29. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 776.
30. See id. at 777 n.6 (citing Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137-38; Act of Mar. 1,
1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102, qui tam statutes passed by the First Congress); James B. Helmer, Jr.
& Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims
Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their Application in the United States ex
rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 37 (1991).
31. See Note, supra note 3, at 89, 97.
32. See id. at 89.
33. See id. at 89-90.
34. See id. at 89.
35. Id.
36. See id. ("This attempt proved unworkable since informers were still needed to enforce
the penal laws of England.").
37. See id. at 89-90.
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one-year statute of limitations and a strict venue requirement, and
removed some of the pleading restrictions on qui tam defendants.38 In
addition to instituting similar measures to prevent qui tam abuses,
American legislatures also gave the government exclusive control over
penal actions.39 This hindered informer abuses and vested the decision
to prosecute solely in the government, which allowed the government
to pardon the entire penalty, including the portion to the abusive
relator, instead of just the government's own share.40
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the use of qui tam
provisions to enforce penal laws in America and England diminished
as public agencies became more effective at law enforcement.4 1 But qui
tam lived on in the United States as the centerpiece of its most
powerful tool for fraud prevention: the False Claims Act.
B. The Lincoln Law
During the Civil War, defense contractors perpetrated rampant
fraud. Contractors sold the Union boots made of cardboard, gun
powder barrels that contained only saw dust, and rotted ship hulls
painted over to look new; they also repeatedly sold the same work
animals.42 In response, Congress passed the False Claims Act of 1863
("1863 Act"). Senator Henry Wilson summarized the need for the new
law during debate leading up to the bill's passage:
Investigating committees in both Houses of Congress have reported the grossest frauds
upon the Government.... The Government finds, however, that it has no law adequate
to punish them. . . . This bill is reported for the purpose of ferreting out and punishing
those enormous frauds upon our Government . . . . We have all of us seen enough, since
this rebellion broke out, of frauds perpetrated upon the Government, and above all, and
more than all, perpetrated upon our soldiers in the field; and I trust that the Senate will
pass this bill, or some bill that will put fraudulent contractors in a position where they
may be punished for their frauds.
43
The 37th Congress saw the qui tam provision as a tool that would
promote the discovery of fraud. Senator Jacob Howard, who sponsored
the legislation, aptly explained how the provision incentivized
informants to come forward and partners in fraud to turn on each
other:
38. See id. at 90.
39. See id. at 97-98.
40. Id. at 98.
41. See id. at 99-101.
42. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2013) (citing 132 CONG.
REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman)).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
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The bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his
coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that class.... In short, . . . I have
based the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh sections upon the old-fashioned idea of
holding out a temptation, and "setting a rogue to catch a rogue," which is the safest and
most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.
4 4
The 1863 Act provided civil and criminal penalties for
submitting fraudulent claims for payment to the U.S. government.45
Under this version of the Act, Congress defined false claims to include
presenting "any claim upon or against the Government of the United
States" to "any person or officer in the civil or military service of the
United States" while "knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent."46 The Act also specifically indicated that many other acts
of treachery against the U.S. military were punishable under the Act,
including submitting false vouchers, making false oaths, forging
signatures, submitting forged papers, conspiring to defraud, stealing
or embezzling, concealing government property, and purchasing
weapons from soldiers.47 The Act gave private citizens the right to file
suit on behalf of the U.S. government against those submitting
fraudulent claims.48 Wrongdoers could face fines equal to double the
amount of damages the government suffered as a result of the fraud,
as well as a $2,000 civil penalty for each false claim submitted,
regardless of whether there was actual damage or loss.49 A relator who
brought a successful suit was then entitled to one-half of the total
penalty that the defendant paid.50
The 1863 Act proved extraordinarily effective at affordably
detecting and deterring fraud.5 1 In the words of a federal district court
in Oregon:
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and
unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and should be construed
accordingly. It was passed upon the theory ... that one of the least expensive and most
effective means of preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them
liable to actions by private persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill
will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the
ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.
5 2
44. Id. at 955-56 (statement of Sen. Howard).
45. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696; Helmer, supra note 42, at 36.
46. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67 § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 4, 12 Stat. 698.
49. Id. § 3, 12 Stat. 698; Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 36.
50. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67 § 6, 12 Stat. 698.
51. Helmer, supra note 42.
52. United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885).
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However, the lucrative nature of FCA claims also produced negative
externalities as rogues of another sort entered the fray.
C. Parasitic Suits and the 1943 Amendment: An Overreaction
While the 1863 Act effectively uncovered fraud,53 it also
attracted numerous parasitic lawsuits based on information relators
learned from criminal indictments.54 In the most important of these
cases, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,55 electrical contractors
conspired to defraud the government through collusive bidding; they
were indicted and pleaded nolo contendere, resulting in a $54,000
fine.56 Subsequently, the petitioner filed a qui tam suit against the
contractors under the FCA, resulting in a $150,000 settlement.57 The
Attorney General used this case as an opportunity to protest the
duplicitous nature of FCA litigation and the common practice of
parasitic lawsuits brought under the Act.58 In an amicus curiae brief,
the Attorney General contended that:
[E]ffective law enforcement requires that control of litigation be left to the Attorney
General; that divided control is against the public interest; that the Attorney General
might believe that war interests would be injured by filing suits such as this; that
permission to outsiders to sue might bring unseemly races for the opportunity of
profiting from the government's investigations; and finally that conditions have changed
since the Act was passed in 1863.59
The Hess Court rejected the Attorney General's complaints, stating it
lacked the authority to invalidate the Act, even though some sections
may have been bad policy.6 0
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Hess, Congress soon
adopted several of the Attorney General's considerations,61
implementing his assertion that agencies alone had become sufficient
53. Helmer, supra note 42, at 1267.
54. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Helmer, supra note 42, at 1267-71
(discussing World War II-era parasitic suits and the accompanying congressional response).
55. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
56. Id. at 545.
57. Id.
58. See Helmer, supra note 42, at 1267-69.
59. Hess, 317 U.S. at 547.
60. Id. at 541-42:
Congress has power to choose this method to protect the government from burdens
fraudulently imposed upon it; to nullify the criminal statute because of dislike of the
independent informer sections would be to exercise a veto power which is not ours.
Sound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the
Congressional will.
61. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608; see Helmer, supra note 42, at
1268-70 (discussing Hess and the subsequent 1943 Amendment).
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to investigate and prosecute fraud.62 Although the House of
Representatives wanted to remove the FCA's qui tam provision
entirely,63 Congress settled on an amendment ("1943 Amendment")
that significantly modified the procedure of bringing False Claims Act
suits and decreased the payouts to successful relators.64 Specifically,
the amendment required that relators filing qui tam suits allege
information that the government does not yet know:
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with [any suit brought under the False
Claims Act] whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon
evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or
employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.
6 5
This jurisdictional bar, which this Note will refer to as the "new-
knowledge requirement," applied even when the government made no
effort to investigate or prosecute the fraud in question.66 While the
change largely eliminated parasitic suits, the new-knowledge
requirement disincentivized relators from incurring the cost of
bringing qui tam suits under the FCA altogether because they could
not accurately predict what evidence or information the government
possessed.67 The amendment also required the relator to present all of
his or her evidence to the government at the time the complaint was
filed; the government then had sixty days to decide whether it would
intervene and litigate the matter itself. 68
Significantly, the 1943 Amendment charged courts to
determine a "fair and reasonable" bounty to award the relator, within
statutorily defined bounds,69 an extreme departure from the
guaranteed recovery of fifty percent under the 1863 Act. The 1943
62. See Helmer, supra note 42, at 1272 ("[T]he 1943 amendments to the False Claims Act
had been passed largely on the unsupported assumption that the Attorney General and
Department of Justice were able and willing to do an adequate job of prosecuting fraud against
the public treasury.").
63. See H.R. 1203, 78th Cong. (1943) (including language eliminating qui tam provisions
that did not pass the Senate); 89 CONG. REC. 7570, 7571 (1943) (discussing the House resolution
and proposing amendments). See generally Helmer, supra note 42, at 1269-70 (discussing the
different goals of House and Senate regarding the 1943 Amendment to the False Claims Act).
64. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608.
65. Id.
66. See United States ex rel. Lapin v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.
Haw. 1980) (holding that the court had no jurisdiction over FCA action because the plaintiff
made no allegations beyond information he already gave to the government before bringing the
suit); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 12 (1986) ("[C]ourts have since adopted a strict interpretation of the
jurisdictional bar as precluding any qui tam suit based on information in the Governments
possession, despite the source.").
67. See Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 39-40.
68. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608.
69. Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. at 609.
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Amendment drastically reduced the maximum statutory damages
awarded to relators.70 If the government intervened, the relator could
recover up to ten percent of the total penalty the defendant incurred,
and if the government declined to intervene, the relator could recover
up to twenty-five percent of the total penalty.7
While the diminished ratio and increased uncertainty of
recovery also discouraged relators from bringing claims, the new-
knowledge requirement diminished the desirability of bringing qui
tam suits under the FCA because defendants could usually find a
government official somewhere who had knowledge of the fraud.72 In
some instances, courts barred relators from bringing qui tam suits
because they reported the fraud to the government before filing suit.7 3
As a result of the 1943 Amendment, False Claims Act suits
virtually disappeared.74 Between 1943 and 1986, only six to ten qui
tam cases were filed each year.7 5
D. The 1986 Amendment: The Rebirth of the False Claims Act
Congress revitalized the False Claims Act in 1986 ("1986
Amendment") to combat growing fraudulent activity among military
contractors and in the healthcare sector.76 A 1981 U.S. Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") report on fraud indicated that between
October 1, 1976, and March 31, 1979, known fraud accounted for
between $150 and $200 million in losses for the U.S. government.77
The Department of Justice estimated that fraud drained up to ten
percent of the entire federal budget, or up to $100 billion annually.78
The GAO study also noted that the government never discovers most
fraud and that those committing fraud are rarely prosecuted.79
Congress recognized that it had erred in 1943 when it assumed that
70. Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 39.
71. Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. at 609.
72. See Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 39-40.
73. Id. at 40; see, e.g., United States v. Aster, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1960) (holding there is
no exception to the government-knowledge rule, even when the relator provided the information
supporting an indictment).
74. Helmer, supra note 42, at 1271.
75. S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 3 (2008).
76. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986).
77. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986); 1 U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-81-73,
FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: How EXTENSIVE IS IT AND How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED
(1981), http://www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-81-57, archived at http://perma.cc/7EEK-LVVV. The
GAO report analyzed seventy-seven thousand cases of fraud and other illegal activities reported
in twenty-one federal agencies. Id. at i.
78. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986).
79. Id. at 2-3.
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agencies alone were sufficient to prevent fraud, and it designed an
amendment to incentivize private parties to bring qui tam suits once
again.80
The 1986 False Claims Act ("FCA") increased payouts to
successful relators for three reasons: to incentivize whistle-blowers to
file more qui tam suits, to increase government recovery, and to
enhance penalties to violators.81 If the government intervened,
relators recovered between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the total
penalty; if the government did not intervene, relators recovered
between twenty-five and thirty percent of the total penalty.82 These
larger shares would also come from a larger pie: Congress increased
the penalties for submitting false claims to between $5,000 and
$10,000 per claim 8 3 and further increased the recovery of actual losses
that the government suffered from double to treble recovery.84
The 1986 changes also expressly overturned the new-
knowledge requirement and replaced it with a public disclosure bar.8 5
Under the public disclosure bar:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing,
audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
8 6
This new jurisdictional bar prevented parasitic suits by excluding qui
tam claims based on information disseminated to the public, thus
limiting FCA qui tam suits to relators with inside knowledge.87
However, the jurisdictional bar provided for an "original source"
exception that allows any "individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and
80. See Helmer, supra note 42, at 1272 ("[Congressional hearings and factual analysis]
demonstrated that while the DOJ was prosecuting some fraud cases, it was simply being
overwhelmed by the level of fraud against the taxpayers.").
81. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153; see S. REP.
No. 99-345, at 1 (1986) ("[T]he Committee believes only a coordinated effort of both the
Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of defrauding public funds. S. 1562
increases incentives, financial and otherwise, for private individuals to bring suits on behalf of
the Government."). Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, references to the "FCA" refer to the
current iteration of the Act.
82. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3156-57.
83. § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153.
84. Id.
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has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
filing an action" to bring a suit under the FCA.88 Furthermore, where
information had been public for six months and the government had
not acted on it, qui tam filers could recover up to ten percent of the
government's damages under the 1986 Amendment.89 To prevent
frivolous or vexatious qui tam claims, the FCA now gave courts
discretion to award defendants reasonable attorney's fees if a
plaintiffs claims were "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought
primarily for purposes of harassment."90
Additionally, the 1986 Amendment cemented the applicable
standard of proof as preponderance of the evidence and clarified the
required degree of knowledge and intent as actual knowledge of,
deliberate ignorance of, or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
the claims.91
III. THE GOVERNMENT-KNOWLEDGE APPROACH: CONSTRUCTION
AND SHORTCOMINGS
Despite Congress's many efforts to properly calibrate the
statutory barriers to bringing qui tam suits under the FCA, prefiling
releases-the waiver of employees' claims against employers executed
before the potential relators file FCA claims-prevent the modern
FCA from optimally detecting and deterring fraud. Although most
prominent FCA cases feature prefiling FCA releases that arose in the
context of settling employment disputes like wrongful discharge, some
cases have considered FCA releases in general termination severance
packages.92 For example, an employee-turned-relator in United States
ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P.93 waived his employer's
liability, including FCA liability, as part of "an enhanced benefits
package to which he would not otherwise have been entitled" after he
elected to leave the company instead of transferring to a new position
as part of a workforce restructuring.94 The prevalence of these
88. Id.
89. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3156. This was seen as justified because but for the relator's suit, the
government would not have recovered. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 22 (1986).
90. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157.
91. § 2, 100 Stat. at 3154; Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 44. Previously there had been a
federal circuit split regarding whether specific intent to defraud was required. Id.
92. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 324 (4th
Cir. 2010) (involving a termination severance package); United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne
Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving settlement of a wrongful
discharge claim).




agreements is difficult to determine because they do not become public
unless challenged in court. This is a primary criticism of the
practice-the fraud is never reported.95 Nonetheless, the existing
evidence supports a reasonable belief that these releases are quite
widespread as companies prudently seek to reduce the risk of FCA
liability, particularly if they suspect that certain employees have some
knowledge of company fraud.96
The Ninth Circuit established the predominant test to
determine the enforceability of a would-be relator's signed release.
The test focuses on whether the government had knowledge of the
fraudulent activity at the time the release was signed.97 The Ninth
Circuit crafted the government-knowledge test through two cases in
the late 1990s: United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp.98 and
United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany.99 Two other
federal courts of appeals have adopted this approach since then.100
Under the Ninth Circuit's test, courts enforce prefiling releases and
dismiss FCA qui tam actions when the government already had
knowledge of the fraud alleged; however, such releases are void as a
matter of public policy when the government did not have knowledge
of the fraud alleged.101
This Part first explains the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
constructing the government-knowledge approach. It then explains
the flaws of the approach. Notably, the approach misaligns whistle-
blower incentives with the FCA's aims and presents information-
obtainment difficulties. Finally, this Part discusses the flaws of the
rejected government-intervention approach to assessing enforceability
and highlights how the approach's deficiencies parallel those of the
government-knowledge approach itself.
95. See infra Part III.B (explaining the flaws of the government-knowledge approach).
96. See United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1175 (10th
Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (arguing that an "express consent rule" would prevent
strategic settlement by companies defrauding the government); Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am.
Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the requirement that the government
approve postfiling FCA settlements exists because "relators can manipulate settlements in ways
that unfairly enrich them and reduce benefits to the government").
97. See generally Todd P. Photopulos & Graham W. Askew, Having Your Cake and Eating
It Too-The (Un)enforceability ofReleases on Future Qui Tam Claims, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE Scl. L.
145, 152-54 (2008) (discussing the Northrop and Teledyne decisions).
98. 59 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. 104 F.3d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 1997).
100. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 329-30 (4th Cir.
2010); Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1169-70.
101. See Teledyne, 104 F.3d at 233 (limiting the Northrop decision to situations where the
government has not already investigated the fraud).
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A. Construction of the Government-Knowledge Approach
In 1988, Michael Green filed a complaint alleging that
Northrop wrongfully terminated him for notifying Northrop officials
that the company had double-charged the U.S. Air Force and for
consulting an attorney.102 Northrop and Green settled the claim for
$190,000 in exchange for Green releasing all current and future
claims against the company relating to or arising out of his
employment.103 In 1991, Green filed a qui tam complaint under the
FCA alleging fraud based upon the same double-charging scheme
discussed in the wrongful termination suit.104 After Green's
allegations, the United States investigated the allegations but
declined to intervene.105 The district court granted Northrop summary
judgment, ruling that the release relinquished Green's claim. 106
The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court and concluded
that enforcing the release was contrary to public policy.1 07 The court
applied the federal common-law test for the enforceability of contracts
negatively affecting public policy, which was established in Town of
Newton v. Rumery108 and Davies v. Grossmont Union High School
Dist.,109 under which "a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement."110 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted Davies to require the court:
(1) to determine whether the agreement waives a right that impacts upon the public
interest; (2) [to] determine whether a substantial public interest would be impaired by
enforcement of the agreement; and (3) to ascertain the reasons apart from the general
interest in settling disputes that support enforcing the agreement.
1 1 1
102. Northrop, 59 F.3d at 956.
103. Id. Green agreed to:
[Rielease, acquit and forever discharge Northrop [and its] employees ... from any and
all claims . . . rights to payment . . . actions and causes of action of every nature,
under any theory under the law, whether . . . statutory or other of any jurisdiction,
whether known or unknown . .. which he had or held, or has or holds, or may claim to
have or to hold by reason of any and all matters . . . including, but not limited to,




105. Id. at 956-57.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 963.
108. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
109. 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991).




The Ninth Circuit held in Green that enforcing the release
would impair a substantial public interest by "nullif[ying] the
incentives Congress intended to create in amending the provisions of
the False Claims Act in 1986."112 Relators may recover only thirty
percent of an FCA settlement, but they may recover all of a private
settlement, so the court worried that enforcing prefiling releases
would incentivize relators with legitimate claims to accept smaller
settlements instead of blowing the whistle on the fraud.113 In many
such situations, the government will not learn of the fraud unless
someone files a qui tam claim.114 And in other instances in which the
government declines to intervene, as was the case here, the
government will not recover unless a relator brought a qui tam
claim.115
Two years later, in Teledyne, the Ninth Circuit limited the
Northrop holding to situations in which the government had not
previously investigated the matter.116 Christopher Hall, a Teledyne
engineer, helped manufacture tubeshells used to sheath nuclear fuel
rods in nuclear reactors.117  Hall believed that Teledyne's
manufacturing methods were inadequate, an opinion that he shared
with both Teledyne management and the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC").s18 Both Teledyne and the NRC
investigated the matter and found the tubeshell manufacturing
methods that Teledyne employed were sufficient to meet customer
requirements.119
Shortly after voicing his concerns to Teledyne, Hall was
suspended for three days for tardiness.120 Hall then filed a complaint
112. Id. at 963.
113. Id. at 965-66. In the words of the Ninth Circuit:
The situation changes when a potential relator and defendant enter into a prefiling
release of a qui tam claim when, as we assume here, that action makes its [sic] less
likely that the government will learn of the fraud. Under these circumstances, the
relator is likely to keep the entire amount of the settlement proceeds. Because the
relator is likely to retain 100 percent as opposed to a maximum 30 percent of the
recovery, a rational relator would be willing to accept a substantially smaller amount
to settle the claim immediately than to preserve the right to eventually file a qui tam
action in which the government would retain the lion's share of the proceeds.
Id.
114. Id. at 966.
115. Id.
116. United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 233 (9th Cir.
1997).
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with the United States Department of Labor ("DOL"). 121 The DOL
ultimately agreed with Hall's allegation of improper retaliation, but
Teledyne ignored the findings and fired Hall.122 Hall's state-court
complaint for wrongful termination and associated offenses alleged
that Teledyne had defrauded its customers, including the federal
government, with its defective tubeshell manufacturing methods.123 In
1993, Teledyne and Hall settled the suit for a "substantial sum of
money" and executed a general release for all actions that were or
could have been brought by Hall in his wrongful termination suit.12 4
In 1994, Hall filed a qui tam complaint under the FCA alleging
that Teledyne committed fraud by falsely assuring its customers that
its tubeshell manufacturing techniques were sufficient.125 The NRC
conducted another investigation and again found Teledyne's methods
adequate, and the government declined to intervene.126 The district
court granted summary judgment to Teledyne on the grounds that the
release previously signed to settle the wrongful termination suit
encompassed Hall's qui tam action.127
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision stating
that the public interest concerns in Northrop were not present here
because the government had already conducted an investigation1 28:
The federal government was aware of Hall's allegations regarding false certifications.
Therefore, the public interest in having information brought forward that the
government could not otherwise obtain is not implicated. The public interest in the use
of qui tam suits to supplement federal enforcement of the FCA is also not disturbed,
because the federal government had already investigated the allegations prior to the
settlement... . The government, of course, was not a party to the release, and is
therefore not barred by it from pursuing a claim against Teledyne.
12 9
Since the Ninth Circuit developed the Northrop-Teledyne




124. Id. at 232. The release stated that it
includes, but is not limited to, all claims which were, or could have been, brought as
claims or counterclaims in the above-referenced action. This Mutual Release of Claims
also includes, but is not limited to, any other claims or complaints which could have
been brought in any other type of action or proceeding.
Id.
125. Id. Specifically Hall alleged that "Teledyne had falsely certified to its customers,
including the United States, that its tubeshells had undergone the heat treatment necessary for
heightened corrosion resistance." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.




on the basis of government knowledge, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
have explicitly adopted it, and the Fifth Circuit has positively
reviewed it.130 At the time of Note's publication, no other federal
courts of appeals had considered the issue since the advent of this
framework.
B. Flaws of the Government-Knowledge Approach
The government-knowledge approach has an attractive-but
deceptive-simplicity to it. Courts will enforce releases when the
government already has knowledge of the fraud while refusing to
enforce releases when a qui tam claim alleges fraud that the
government has not yet discovered. But this approach has many
problems: it frustrates the goal of supplementing government
prosecution with private suits, a significant purpose of the FCA; it
discourages relators from coming forward, even when the government
is not aware of fraudulent activity, by putting relators' settlements at
risk; and it puts relators in the difficult position of deciding whether to
bring a qui tam claim without knowing what information the
government possesses.
Furthermore, the government-knowledge approach creates
incentives for would-be relators that are inconsistent with the FCA's
public policy goals. The Teledyne court worried that whistle-blowers
would settle out of court and fail to disclose fraud to the government
at all:
The effect of enforcing releases when the government has no knowledge of the qui tam
claims would be to encourage relators to settle privately and release their claims, thus
retaining 100 percent of the recovery, instead of providing the government with
information and retaining at most the 30 percent recovery available in a qui tam
action.13
1
However, this analysis omits some important public policy aspects of
the False Claims Act. The FCA had three aims: (1) incentivizing
insiders to blow the whistle on fraud, (2) supplementing the
government's efforts to recover money lost from fraud, and (3)
130. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 329-33 (4th Cir.
2010); United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (10th Cir.
2009); see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 473-74
(5th Cir. 2009) (hinting that it would adopt the government-knowledge approach in the
appropriate case, but resting its decision on the fact that the release was signed eleven days after
filing the qui tam action). But see United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d
909, 919 (8th Cir. 2001) (denying application of the government-knowledge approach because the
settlement agreement occurred in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding).
131. Teledyne, 104 F.3d at 233.
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deterring fraudulent claims. 13 2 The Ninth Circuit focused on the first
public policy concern in formulating the government-knowledge
approach33 at the expense of the other two motivations.134
As Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe explained in her dissent in
United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., in which the
Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's government-knowledge
approach, "[tlhe [government-knowledge approach] ... undermines
one of the other public interests under the FCA: the Government's
compensatory interest in recouping funds lost due to fraud."135 The
government has two possible reasons not to pursue a civil fraud suit
itself: first, the suit lacks merit, or second, the government has
insufficient resources to take on the litigation.136 To maximize
recovery, the Government needs relators to litigate claims about
known fraud that the Government lacks the resources to litigate itself.
The FCA was intended to incentivize private citizens to bring suit on
behalf of the government in order to supplement the government's
own recovery efforts, but "[b]y allowing contractors to buy off relators
whose resources would otherwise be available to pursue fraud claims
on behalf of the Government, the exception from Hall disregards the
Government's compensatory interest in recouping funds lost due to
fraud."137
Moreover, the government-knowledge approach likely
disincentivizes relators from coming forward even when the
government has not investigated the fraud. As discussed above, a
primary reason for the 1986 Amendment was to repeal the new-
knowledge jurisdictional bar that discouraged whistle-blowers from
coming forward and crippled the 1943 version of the False Claims
Act.138 Similarly, the government-knowledge approach discourages
whistle-blowers that have signed releases from alerting the
132. Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1173-77 (Briscoe, J., dissenting); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at
2, 4, 8 (1986).
133. See Teledyne, 104 F.3d at 233 ("It is commonly recognized that the central purpose of
the qui tam provisions of the FCA is to set up incentives to supplement government enforcement
of the Act . . . ." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
134. Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1174 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ('The Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Hall focuses primarily on the first interest: providing insiders with incentives to come
forward with information about fraud against the Government."); see Teledyne, 104 F.3d at 233.
Most of the cases applying the Northrop-Teledyne framework have likewise focused on these
incentives. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 481 F.Supp.2d
815, 818-21 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (approving of but not explicitly adopting the government-knowledge
approach).
135. Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1173-77 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1174
137. Id. at 1175.
138. See Helmer & Neff, supra note 30, at 49-50.
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government to fraud, lest the government already be investigating the
matter, thereby eliminating possible relator compensation. Filing an
FCA case in such a scenario might forfeit the settlement he relator
received in exchange for signing the release.139 At the culmination of
an unsuccessful FCA case, one Colorado district court required a
relator to return $125,892 received as part of a settlement that
included the relator's waiver of the right to initiate any action relating
to the relator's employment.140 Depending on the wording of the
release the would-be relator signed, filing a qui tam suit under the
FCA might force the relator to forfeit any previous settlement made
contingent on waiving claims.
A would-be relator also faces practical difficulties in
determining if anyone in the government has already investigated the
fraud that the relator intends to expose. Such investigations are
generally kept secret from those committing the fraud to prevent them
from evading prosecution, so a relator would not be in a position to
determine if the government is investigating such fraud until after
filing the qui tam action. With potential forfeiture of the settlement
agreement a viable possibility, it is unlikely that a relator would
undertake the costs of an FCA suit for the mere chance to enjoy a
portion of any government recovery.
C. The Government-Intervention Approach: A Flawed Alternative
After the proliferation of the government-knowledge approach,
a federal court in the Southern District of Georgia sought to augment
the approach by considering whether the government declined to
intervene in the case.141 The government-intervention approach
sought to avoid many of the ills that plagued the government-
knowledge approach, but it also suffered from many serious
shortcomings itself and has not gained serious traction. Although the
government-intervention approach has contributed little to FCA
prefiling release jurisprudence, its flaws inform what a better
approach would be.
139. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jimenez v. Health Net, Inc., No. 99-cv-01259-EWN-
MJW, 2005 WL 2002435, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2005) (noting that the relator forfeited a
$125,000 settlement received in exchange for a waiver of all claims relating to employment and a
representation that no claims against the employer were pending because the relator failed to
disclose that an FCA suit against the employer was already filed).
140. Id.
141. Unites States ex rel. Whitten v. Triad Hosps., Inc., No. Civ.A. CV202-189, 2005 WL
3741538, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2005) (interpreting the contract at issue narrowly to find the
FCA claim was not waived), rev'd on other grounds, 210 F. App'x 878 (11th Cir. 2006).
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In Whitten, a hospital employee entered into a severance
agreement under which the hospital paid him $124,000 in exchange
for releasing any current or future claims against it.14 2 The hospital
employee later filed an FCA qui tam action alleging health-care billing
fraud.143 The government declined to intervene in the case.144 The
district court held the severance agreement enforceable because the
government declined to intervene.145 The court reasoned that the
public policy interest in encouraging the disclosure of fraud "is served
adequately by a rule that prohibits a litigant who has agreed to
release his right to serve as a relator from maintaining a qui tam
action if the government declines to intervene in the action."146
The Eleventh Circuit later overturned the case on a narrow
contract question,147 but another federal district court in Georgia later
considered the logic of the government-intervention rule and
explained its defects.148 The court reasoned that whether the
government declined to intervene should not control the enforceability
of the release because "the Government can elect not to intervene for a
variety of reasons, many of which-such as availability of U.S.
Attorneys-have nothing to do with the merits."149 Nonintervention
does not necessarily indicate government disinterest in the action, as
the government stands entitled to most of the proceeds even if it
decides not to intervene.1 0 Moreover, "a potential relator could not
know with certainty that the Government would intervene in an
action, [so] less relators would come forward and expose fraud-the
key purpose of the FCA." 151
Although the criticisms of the government-intervention rule
address the prudence of enforcing the government's decision to
intervene, these same imperfections also permeate the government-
knowledge approach. The government's decision not to intervene in a
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id. at*1.
144. See id. at *2-6 (granting summary judgment to the defendant). Although the opinion
never explicitly states that the government declined to intervene, it can be inferred from the
structure of the test and the decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant.
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id.
147. See United States ex rel. Whitten v. Triad Hosps., Inc., 210 F. App'x 878, 882 (11th Cir.
2006) (determining that the severance agreement did not prevent the employee from bringing a
False Claims Act claim).
148. United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. InterContinental Univ., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2277-






case mirrors the government's decision not to bring its own case
against those committing fraud. The government may decide not to
bring its own claim for a variety of reasons, such as the availability of
U.S. Attorneys, but this decision does not necessarily indicate a lack of
government interest in a relator filing a qui tam action. Likewise, the
uncertainty in assessing whether the government will intervene in a
case mirrors the uncertainty in deciding whether the government
already has knowledge of the false claims. When relators file qui tam
FCA claims, they cannot know with certainty whether the government
already has knowledge of the fraud, and hence the prefiling releases
deter them from bringing such a claim, the enforceability of which
depends on the government's knowledge.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: PRIOR AGENCY APPROVAL
This Part proposes that Congress adopt an approach that
enforces a prefiling FCA release only when the government has
approved the release following an investigation. This agency-approval
approach is more consistent with the FCA's three aims: First, it aligns
whistle-blower incentives by removing the dilemma insiders face when
choosing between a certain settlement and the potential partial
recovery of an FCA claim. Second, it supplements the government's
efforts to recover money lost from fraud by allowing relators to proceed
with claims that the government supports but does not have the
resources to bring itself. Third, it deters fraudulent claims by
strengthening the qui tam provisions of the FCA and making every
insider a potential whistle-blower whose silence may not be bought by
a prefiling settlement. Additionally, the agency-approval approach
mirrors the FCA requirement that the government approve any
postfiling release.
This better approach would enforce releases of FCA liability
only when the government has approved the release. Chief Judge
Briscoe, in her Lockheed Martin dissent, proposed that the courts
should only enforce prefiling FCA releases when the Attorney General
has approved them.152 In practice, this would probably involve the
Attorney General interfacing with various government agencies to
determine if any agency had cleared the company of the specific
allegations of fraud. Instead of placing the decisionmaking authority
with the Attorney General, this Note argues that when a government
agency completes an investigation of fraud, it should certify to the
152. United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1175 (10th Cir.
2009) (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
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company that the company may contract with employees to waive
their right to file qui tam FCA claims about the specific instance of
fraud investigated. Such an approach is administratively low cost, as
the investigating agency is already interfacing with the company
during the investigation. It is also more efficient than the approach
that Chief Judge Briscoe proposed, as a second "mini-investigation" by
the Attorney General to determine if an agency has investigated the
fraud is not necessary.
For example, under Chief Judge Briscoe's proposal, to
determine whether to approve the Teledyne release, the Attorney
General would consult the NRC and other agencies to decide if any
had determined the tubeshell production was not fraudulent.153
However, under the agency-approval approach, after completing its
investigation, the NRC itself would certify to Teledyne that it could
contract for enforceable releases of qui tam FCA claims regarding the
tubeshell production.
A. Consistency with the Three Purposes of the False Claims Act
Under the proposed agency-approval approach, the only way
for an insider with knowledge of fraud to profit from such knowledge
is to bring a qui tam claim. The approach would prevent employers
from exchanging generous severance packages for the would-be
relator's silence because releases associated with these severance
packages would not be enforced unless the government approved
them. This would solve the problem of misaligned incentives discussed
in Northrop-that would-be relators might release the right to file
FCA suits in exchange for small, but guaranteed, out-of-court
settlements, and hence never report the fraud in the first place.154 The
lack of agency certification establishes the unenforceability of these
releases before their creation, making such agreements unprofitable to
employers. The government may simply decline to approve the
release. Although companies might still offer unenforceable
settlements in exchange for prefiling FCA releases, and some potential
relators might mistakenly believe the contracts are enforceable, those
allured by the massive FCA damages would quickly learn from their
attorneys that the company could not enforce the agreement.
Moreover, rationally minded companies should offer smaller
153. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 231-32
(9th Cir. 1997).
154. United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1995).
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settlements, as they discount for the unenforceability risk, which
would reduce the overall appeal of the settlements.
The agency-approval approach would also deter relators from
bringing frivolous suits. In situations like that in Teledyne-where the
NRC had already investigated and determined that the company had
not submitted false claims regarding its nuclear reactor sheath
manufacturing process155-the government should approve the FCA
release. But the government should be careful not to approve overly
broad releases that might waive qui tam rights to allege other
instances of fraud in the company that the government has yet to
investigate. For example, if the government had approved a release for
Teledyne employees, the release should have been restricted to claims
arising out of the same subject matter as the NRC's investigation into
the nuclear reactor sheath. Because if Teledyne were also making
fraudulent claims to the Department of Health and Human Services
regarding the health care it provided to its employees, a general
release could bar qui tam claims on the health-care fraud issue when
the government has only investigated the nuclear reactor sheath
manufacturing. If the government were satisfied with its investigation
and conclusion that no fraud occurred, approving a narrowly
constructed release would preclude warrantless claims while also
permitting meritorious qui tam claims about other instances of fraud.
The agency-approval approach would maximize recovery
because it incentivizes whistle-blowers to bring more FCA qui tam
suits. The government's knowledge of the fraud would no longer
prevent would-be relators who have signed releases from bringing
claims. In instances in which the government has knowledge of the
fraud but has not brought suit, this approach would not inhibit
relators from bringing qui tam suits, as would have occurred under
the government-knowledge approach. Chief Judge Briscoe explained
this issue in her Lockheed Martin dissent, in which she proposed that
the Attorney General approve prefiling releases:
[T]here is still a risk under [Teledyne] that the Government will not bring a meritorious
claim simply because the Government lacks the resources to do so. The parties will
likely know this, and the contractor will pay the relator more money to reflect the
probability that resource constraints will preclude the Government from bringing the
claim independently. An express consent rule helps prevent this problem by allowing
the Government to veto the release of relators who would otherwise pursue meritorious
FCA claims with their own resources.
1 5 6
For the government, there is virtually no drawback to incentivizing
more qui tam claims, especially because it stands to recover a sizeable
155. Teledyne, 104 F.3d at 231.
156. Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1176 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
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portion of the damages awarded in a relator's successful qui tam suit.
In every successful case, the government receives at least seventy
percent of the recovery.15 7 Because the FCA subjects defendants that
have been found liable to treble damages, the government stands to
recover at least 210 percent of the defrauded money, plus its share of
the $5,000 to $10,000 penalty suffered for each false claim a defendant
submitted.15 8 So, even though the government would have recovered
more had it brought the suit itself, qui tam suits are still quite
lucrative.
Preventing relators from contracting away their right to bring
qui tam actions would further promote fraud detection because only
through filing such an action could an insider gain financially from his
or her knowledge of fraud. In addition, to get a release approved, a
company would need to disclose enough information to satisfy the
government that it does not need the relator to bring the fraud to
light; this would aid the government goal of increased fraud
detection. 159
If companies cannot presettle qui tam claims with potential
relators, they will have one fewer tool to hide fraud; thus, deterrence
will be maximized. Further, if any employee who discovers fraud
stands to gain up to thirty percent of treble damages, companies
would think twice about committing fraud. At the very least, those
who commit fraud would not be able to use employees to commit the
fraud and then coerce them into signing severance deals that forbid
them from filing qui tam actions.
B. Consistency with the FCA Postfiling Requirement
The agency-approval approach mirrors the FCA's treatment of
postfiling settlements.160 Once a relator files a qui tam suit under the
FCA, "[t]he action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney
General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for
157. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (2012) (providing that a relator receive up to, but in any
event no more than, thirty percent of the action or settlement's proceeds).
158. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The government recovers seventy percent of treble damages, so it
recovers seventy percent of three hundred percent damages. Since 0.7 x 300 is 210, the
government's minimum damages recovery from an FCA claim is 210 percent. This calculation
excludes the $5,000 to $10,000 per claim fine, which increases the government's recovery for
every fraudulent claim.
159. See Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1176 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ("[I]f we require the
Government's express consent, then contractors will be forced to disclose enough information to
satisfy the Government. This will help the Government investigate the alleged fraud, and it will
ensure that the Government is satisfied with its investigation before a relator can be released.").
160. Id. at 1175.
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consenting."6 1 This requirement exists because the claim itself
belongs to the U.S. government, and a relator should not be able to
settle the government's claims without its consent. Likewise, a party
should not be able to presettle a future qui tam suit by releasing the
right to bring the suit in the first place without the government's
consent. Since Congress has given the Attorney General the authority
to assess postfiling settlements, it makes sense to extend agencies the
same authority to approve prefiling "settlements" after they conduct
investigations that do not produce sufficient evidence of fraud.
Although one might argue that it would be administratively
cumbersome for the government to approve or disapprove of every
agreement that contained a waiver of FCA qui tam rights, this would
easily be avoided by requiring the parties seeking approval to submit
proof that the alleged fraud at issue has already been investigated by
the government and determined not to be fraudulent.162 As noted
above, government agencies, upon completing an investigation of
fraud, would only need to tack on one additional task to their
investigation: the certification to the company that it has the
government's permission to contract for the waiver of FCA qui tam
claims for the specific instance of fraud investigated. Thus, in
situations like that in Teledyne, in which the NRC twice investigated
the production of the nuclear reactor sheathes, the NRC would
approve the release upon completing its investigations. In situations
in which the parties could not present evidence of such an
investigation and agency approval, courts would refuse to enforce the
agreement and would permit the relator to file a suit.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCA was enacted to offer a bounty to private citizens so
that they would report fraud and thereby prevent fraudsters from
stealing from the federal government. The government-knowledge
approach, currently employed to determine the enforceability of
prefiling releases of qui tam rights under the FCA, denies the
government the ability to enlist citizens to bring claims on its behalf
in many circumstances. A better approach would be to enforce
prefiling releases only when the government has given prior consent
to the release. This approach would be consistent with the treatment
161. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
162. See Lockheed Martin, 558 F.3d at 1177 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government will
only agree to be a party to the release if it has adequately investigated the alleged fraud and if
the settlement provides the Government with adequate compensation.")
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received by postfiling releases; promote fraud detection, deterrence,
and recovery; properly align whistle-blower incentives; and better
align with public policy while also allowing companies to avoid
vexatious suits brought in instances in which the government has
already determined no fraud occurred.
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